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WRITING 
 
David W. Kidner*  
 
 
During the past several decades, a number of accounts of environmental and 
ethnic wisdom have appeared which have later been exposed as fraudulent. I 
suggest that the widespread popularity of these accounts should be 
understood as symptomatic of valid feelings and awarenesses that are unable 
to find expression in the modern world, and are usually dissociated from 
mainstream decision-making processes. I argue that as the natural order 
continues to be degraded, forms such as fiction which currently have 
relatively low status will become more important as vehicles for feelings, 
ideas, and possibilities which can find no other refuge within a world 
increasingly dominated by technological and economic viewpoints.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION: ENVIRONMENTAL 'FRAUDS' 
 
 Over the past century, there have been several enthusiastically embraced 
accounts of environmental lore that have eventually been recognized as less than 
entirely authentic. Among the most well known and less obviously concocted of 
these is the case of 'Chief Seattle's speech' – a homily of ecological wisdom that 
turned out to have been written not by the chief of the Suquamish himself, but 
rather by Ted Perry, a white University professor, loosely based on what Seattle had 
been reported as saying.i A second case concerns the writings of 'Grey Owl', who 
claimed to have been born to an Apache chief and a Scottish woman, and whose 
books about his life in the Canadian wilderness enjoyed wide popularity in the 
1930's.ii He was later revealed as Archie Belaney, who was born in Hastings on the 
south coast of England and later adopted his chosen identity after emigrating to 
Canada. While these writings have often simply been dismissed as fraudulent, their 
enormous popularity suggests that they tapped into a deep-seated need among 
Euroamerican readers, and that this might usefully be regarded as symptomatic of 
something that is denied in industrial society. If a symptom can be regarded both as 
the expression of a repressed need and as an attempt to compensate for it, what is it 
that is repressed in the modern world, and how might it be authentically expressed? 
In order to explore these issues, I begin with a lengthy detour into the character of 
truth in modern society.   
 
 
TRUTH, CORRECTNESS, AND IDENTITY 
 
 A truthful statement is commonly understood either as one that accurately 
refers to some transcendent property of the outside world or as one that is consistent 
with some consensual system of thought such as logic; or as some combination of 
these. As modern humanity distances itself from the natural order and encloses itself 
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within a technologically created realm, the emphasis is shifting from the first of 
these criteria to the second. Increasingly, truth is defined in terms of that subset of 
the real that is scientifically plausible, politically acceptable, and economically 
exploitable; and as the world is physically reconstructed through the application of 
technology, so the first criterion of truth seems to fade. For example, the statement 
that nature is 'a human creation' expresses the growing skepticism in the 
industrialized world that there is anything genuinely 'other', anything outside and 
beyond human action and human reason; and as technological rationality colonizes 
the world ideologically and physically, so such statements – which would have been 
viewed as absurd even 50 years ago – become increasingly accurate descriptions of 
the way the world is. Thus the notion of truth as founded in the character of a 
natural reality that is greater than the form it might take within any particular 
cultural system or era is giving way to the idea of truth as reflecting the principles of 
one specific, technologically transformed world. This reflects a widespread but tacit 
acceptance of the 'end of ideology' hypothesis, implying that the sort of world we 
live in today is the only possible world. Given this 'idolatry of the actual', 
ecologically sound lifestyles tend to be viewed as unrealistic, childish fantasies or as 
harmless aberrations. And while intelligent, communicating, nonhuman creatures 
are common in children's stories and Hollywood science fiction, we are expected to 
leave them behind when we close the book or leave the cinema, returning to a 'real' 
world that is increasingly bereft of such qualities.  
 This shrinkage of the real toward a reified present leads to the view that 
qualities that are inexpressible in scientific termsiii are invalid or nonexistent. To say 
that a particular area of forest is populated by certain species or is rich in certain 
chemical elements, for example, may be correct; but it is a very impoverished 
expression of what the forest is in its entirety. While the first version of truth aspires 
to express this entirety (Heidegger's aletheia, or 'unconcealment'), the second version, 
'correctness', merely maps it onto a particular system of understandingiv, and then in 
turn, re-imposes this understanding onto the world. If we insist on the reality of 
those qualities that tend to be ignored by merely 'correct' descriptions, then we are 
forced to look for means of expressing them other than the forms of science that 
have been conscripted into the cause of industrial growth. There are clear 
implications here for the sort of world that results from our behavior, given our 
enormous technological power; for qualities unrecognizable by such sciences tend to 
have a limited life expectancy. Spirits and gods once seemed real; and today not 
only ecosystems, but the idea of the ecosystem may be in danger of following them 
into oblivion. 
 There are implications, too, for our identities as human beings. If the world 
seems entirely rationally understandable, then feeling, spirit, and emotion become 
'irrational' and therefore suspect. Of course, not all experience can be directly taken 
as a valid guide to what is true or moral; and it is one of the tasks of a sophisticated 
culture to interpret and articulate experience appropriately. A firm sense of identity 
needs to be grounded in a world that is experienced as complementing our senses, 
faculties, and indwelling expectations; and this experience motivates our intuition of 
the first version of truth, which grows out of our embodied resonance with those 
aspects of the natural world that we have interacted with in the course of our 
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evolutionary history. Since we evolved as multi-sensory creatures, it is reasonable to 
assume that all our senses and faculties have a part to play in forming our identities. 
What David Levin refers to as "the body's primordial and archaic attunement … its 
implicit structures of pre-understanding … of what is basically good, basically true, 
and basically beautiful"v provides our fundamental moral and epistemological 
orientation. This first version of truth accepts that although the senses, along with 
intuition, feeling, and instinct, provide us with meanings that may be difficult to 
articulate, they nevertheless enable us to reach out to insights and forms of relation 
that are omitted by many scientific models.   
 For example, Robert Ryan, in a study of three urban natural areas in Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, found that the more active users of an area developed a 'place-
specific attachment', protesting against proposed changes, favoring minimal 
management and a policy of letting nature take its course. Ryan notes the "very real 
sense of personal loss or grief when favorite natural areas are changed or threatened 
by change", emotions which are, however, "not always verbally expressed."vi. The 
emotional relation to place, in a sense, was not merely an element of self, but 
reached beyond self to become a stabilizing force within the ecosystem, suggesting a 
potentially more integrated self-place system. Writ large, this may be the nascent 
form of a natural process that is usually stifled by forms of 'education' which 
emphasize the detachment of self from world: a process of growing into the world, 
so that identity is no longer simply personal identity, but becomes that of the 
person-in-the-world.vii This form of identity, and its implications for ethics and 
epistemology, sits uncomfortably with our roles as consumers and workers; and it 
may embody a deeper truth that transcends short-term industrialist realities. 
 Truth defined in this way as not only scientifically understood, but also as the 
sensed, felt expression of the forms that a healthy life in a healthy world might take, 
is only partly conscious and remains mostly at the level of 'gut feelings' within 
modern society. Frequently, the forms in which it is expressible are either 
marginalized or intrinsically suspect: poetry and film are viewed as 'leisure' 
activities, licensed to depart temporarily from the important stuff of life such as 
share prices or genetic structures; and environmentalists are rightly suspicious of 
religious fundamentalisms, specious pseudo-sciences, or fanciful 'New Age' 
orientations. Sometimes, we feel pressured to translate our felt sense of what is right 
into the language of science, as Eugene Hargrove points out in referring to Ian 
Douglas-Hamilton's study of the attitudes of rangers in a Tanzanian national park. 
In this case, elephants were demolishing most of the trees, and one obvious course 
of action was to cull the elephants. But none of the rangers wanted to shoot the 
elephants, feeling that they had great intrinsic value. Nevertheless "they did not 
believe that their feelings could be part of a professional justification for not 
shooting the elephants. Given that such justifications were closed off for him, 
Douglas-Hamilton concluded that he was supposed to find some facts that would 
independently justify this position so that aesthetic considerations would not have 
to be mentioned."viii  Truths expressible in the language of science are easily 
accepted. Truths that cannot be so expressed may be constantly reborn in the fringes 
of consciousness, but are also constantly extinguished when they venture into the 
unsympathetic gaze of the technological world. As a result of this repressive denial 
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of our experience, truth shrinks back towards correctness; and the resulting unease 
is interpreted as individual pathology.ix Visions of a healthy world based on felt 
truths and relations as well as on scientific knowledge are conventionally seen as 
unrealistic fantasies rather than possibilities to be worked towards; and so the 
corporate world replaces nature as the grounding basis of our lives.  
 
THE 'NATURAL' IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 
 
 Nature in its entirety is vastly more complex than the models we use to 
understand it; and so while science offers us powerful understanding, there are 
certain aspects of nature that cannot be viewed through a scientific lens – as, I think, 
many scientists would agree. In a discussion of cartography, for example, Tim 
Ingold refers to the "discrepancy between truth and accuracy … the more [we aim] 
to furnish a precise and comprehensive representation of reality, the less true to life 
this representation appears." He continues: 
In the cartographic world … all is still and silent. There is neither sunlight 
nor moonlight; there are no variations of light or shade; no clouds, no 
shadows or reflections. The wind does not blow, neither disturbing the trees 
nor whipping the water into waves. No birds fly in the sky, or sing in the 
woods; forests and pastures are devoid of animal life; houses and streets are 
empty of people and traffic. To dismiss all this … is perverse, to say the least. 
For it is no less than the stuff of life itself … .x  
 
 Curiously, however, scientific models are often regarded as incorporating 
more accurate, deeper understandings than the realities they describe. Jean-Pierre 
Dupuy has pointed out that the term 'model' in scientific discourse has a meaning 
opposite to that of everyday speech. Normally, when we 'model' something, we 
produce a representation, an imitation of it; whereas a scientific model   
enjoys … a transcendent position, not unlike that of a Platonic Idea, of which 
reality is only a pale imitation. … It is at this point that the hierarchical 
relation between the imitation and the imitated comes to be inverted. 
Although the scientific model is a human imitation of nature, the scientist is 
inclined to regard it as a 'model' [for] nature. Thus nature is taken to imitate 
the very model by which man tries to imitate it.xi 
  
 In other words, our understandings of nature are claimed to be more real, 
more basic, than the natural world they set out to describe; and this suppresses all 
those qualities of nature that exist beyond science. While the domesticated world 
can, with some violence, be made consistent with scientific understandings, the wild 
world is, literally, another story. Wilderness stretches away from us, extending 
beyond the horizon not only of our vision, but also of our understanding and our 
imagination. That is what makes it so hard to define: it is partly accessible, but also 
partly inaccessible. As Edward Abbey remarks, wilderness "means something lost 
and something still present, something remote and at the same time intimate, 
something buried in our blood and nerves, something beyond us and without 
limit."xii  In order to express some of what is beyond the horizon of current 
understanding, we have to embrace forms of communication such as fiction and 
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myth. Myth need not be in opposition to reality, but can expand and deepen 
understanding so that it reaches toward currently unrealized possibilities. As Robin 
Riddington explains in discussing Dunne-za mythologies: 
In our thoughtworld, myth and reality are opposites. Unless we can find 
some way to understand the reality of mythic thinking, we remain prisoners 
of our own thoughtworld … the language of Western social science assumes 
an objective world independent of individual experience. The language of 
Indian stories assumes that objectivity can only be approached through 
experience. A hunter encounters his game first in a dream, then in physical 
reality. In the Indian thoughtworld, stories about talking animals and stories 
about summer gatherings are equally true because both describe personal 
experience. Their truths are complementary."xiii 
 
 Ecological meanings that are becoming endangered continue to exist in the 
resonances evoked by the Seattle 'speech' or in Grey Owl's words, in the properties 
of nature that we sense experientially but cannot express, and in the repugnance we 
feel about the technological transformation of nature. Our difficulty in articulating 
such feelings does not make them invalid, but tells us something about the 
narrowing conceptual frame within which we are tacitly expected to locate not only 
'external' nature, but also our own lives and identities. As Leon Kass has argued: 
In crucial cases, … repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, 
beyond reason's power fully to articulate it. Can anyone really give an 
argument fully adequate to the horror which is father-daughter incest (even 
with consent), or having sex with animals, or mutilating a corpse, or eating 
human flesh, or even just (just!) raping or murdering another human being? 
Would anybody's failure to give full rational justification for his or her 
revulsion at these practices make that revulsion ethically suspect? Not at all. 
On the contrary, we are suspicious of those who think that they can 
rationalize away our horror, say, by trying to explain the enormity of incest 
with arguments only about the genetic risks of inbreeding.xiv  
 
 While scientific language offers us the most powerful system of 
understanding the world has known, it is not a complete understanding. A 
mature scientific awareness should be ready to recognize the limitations of 
science, and to draw – albeit critically and cautiously – on other vehicles to 




COGNITIVE AND ECOLOGICAL REALITIES 
 
 Much of what we hint at when we refer to 'ecology' has to do with the 
emergent properties of large systems – those properties that depend on, but are not 
reducible to, the properties of components of such systems. Similarly, much of what 
makes us human reflects the emergent properties of cultural systems that are 
scientifically inexplicable and empirically untestable. Rational understanding can 
explain the behavior of individual cells fairly adequately, that of individual 
creatures rather less adequately, and that of the larger systems we are part of hardly 
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at all – which is why we have little comprehension of the direction our society is 
heading in, and even less of the large-scale ecological systems it is displacing. 
Consequently, the most fundamental issues of our time are precisely those we can 
articulate least clearly; and this largely accounts for our persistent attraction to 
cultural identities and texts which express more adequately our potential place 
within the natural world.   
 As soon as we learn to count and to categorize, we are cemented into a 
cognitive system that organizes the world through conceptual similarities and 
differences. As Tim Ingold points out, we are taught that " … every creature is 
specified in its essential nature through the bestowal of attributes passed down 
along lines of descent, independently and in advance of its placement in the world." 
Consequently, "difference is rendered as diversity. Thus living things are classified 
and compared … in terms of intrinsic properties that they are deemed to possess by 
virtue of genealogical connection, irrespective of their positioning in relation to one 
another in an environment."xv  A butterfly, we learn, is like a moth, but different to a 
buddleia. In ecological systems, however, butterflies and moths have few significant 
relationships; while butterflies and buddleias do. Our systems of classification, then, 
are selectively based in those specific natural characteristics that we can recognize 
and cognitively order, and we tend to ignore those other less accessible natural 
characteristics that have to do with relation and systemic functioning. The 
conceptual structure of rational thought, in other words, diverges from and takes 
precedence over the ecological structure of the natural world.  
 As Steve Buchmann and Gary Nabhan point out, a "biologically rich place is 
rich in relationships as well as in species. Conversely, the loss of biodiversity is 
always more than the simple loss of species; it is also the extinction of ecological 
relationships."xvi This suggests that the essence of a creature (including a human 
being), far from being defined just by innate characteristics, may reside partly in its 
developing relational extensions into structures larger than itself. Just as the pink 
lady slipper orchid cannot reproduce itself without being part of a larger structure 
that also includes the bumble bees that pollinate it, so humans are dependent on the 
cultural structures that according to Geertz "are not mere expressions, 
instrumentalities, or correlates of our biological, psychological, and social existence; 
they are prerequisites of it."xvii Consequently, the silent but relentless dilapidation of 
cultural, social, and ecological relations, although difficult to quantify, is as 
devastating for us as the absence of bumble bees is for the pink lady slipper orchid. 
Adopting a relational identity, then, suddenly brings into focus forms of damage 
that have previously seemed ephemeral. Loss of community, of extended family 
ties, of ecological relatedness, no longer seem less real than biological damage; and 
terms such as a 'broken heart' or an 'emotional wrench' begin to appear less as 
metaphors than as descriptions of previously hidden realities. 
 Those emergent properties that we term 'ecological', and that cognition finds 
difficult to cope with, tend to be omitted from our definitions of both nature and 
humanity. Today, the cult of individualism, fostered by capitalism, has pushed any 
structures larger than the 'things' we can see and identify to the periphery of what is 
cognitively acceptable. Just as "there is no such thing as society",xviii so ecosystems, 
supposedly, are no more than "transitory assemblages of biotic and abiotic elements 
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that exist (or could exist) contingent upon accidents of environmental history, 
evolutionary chance, human management, and the theoretical perspective one 
applies to define the boundaries".xix According to Donald Worster, when population 
ecologists look at a forest, they see  
 only trees. See them and count them – so many white pines, so many 
hemlocks, so many maples and birches. They insist that if we know all there is 
to know about the individual species that constitute a forest, and can measure 
their lives in precise, quantitative terms, we will know all there is to know 
about that forest. It has no 'emergent' or organismic properties. It is not some 
whole greater than the sum of its parts, requiring 'holistic' understanding."xx 
 
As one population ecologist puts it, if ecosystems have properties that are more than 
the sum of their parts, then "the study of these systems should perhaps be carried 
out by theologians rather than scientists."xxi  Such views veto the scientific study of 
emergent properties, which are viewed as unreal or even nonexistent, just as 
Thatcher's statement about the nonexistence of society denies that we are defined 
partly by the structures we grow into and participate in. The slippage is from 
methodological reductionism to ontological reductionism: in other words, it is one 
thing to recognize that understanding the pieces is a useful step in understanding 
the whole, but quite another to claim that the whole simply is the sum of the pieces. 
Writ large and translated into technological actions, this error obliterates the systems 
whose existence they deny: not just ecological systems, but also social, linguistic and 
cultural ones, along with the emotional and spiritual possibilities that depend on 
their existence.  
 Furthermore, denying the existence of emergent properties results in an 
emphasis on constancy rather than change. Life evolves through ever greater 
complexity of organization, including temporal organization; so while the basic 
components of life – say, molecules – remain the same, they become involved in 
increasingly complex patterns, processes, and cycles as we move towards more 
inclusive levels of functioning. Defining a person or other natural entity by their 
fixed attributes rather than by the structures and processes they grow into during 
their lives puts a boundary around the individual ego and denies that growth can 
occur across this boundary. If we assume that "persons embody certain attributes of 
appearance, temperament, and mentality by virtue of their ancestry, and … these are 
passed on in a form that is unaffected by the circumstances or achievements of their 
life in the world",xxii then identity shrinks towards our genetic and social origins, and 
it becomes impossible to extend oneself into any cause, idea, or vision that extends 
beyond one's own life. However, experience teaches us that if we work to conserve 
wilderness, join a community, change our spiritual allegiances, or give birth, these 
changes affect who we are.  
 Inherited attributes, rather than being taken as a starting point for growth 
and transformation through participation, are all too often taken as boundary 
conditions for identity. Our blindness to larger systems carries with it a secondary 
blindness: that which prevents us from recognizing the possibilities of our own 
transformation within these larger systems. As individuals, we can supposedly 
develop attachments to a few other humans while our relations with the rest of the 
world remain instrumental, based in assumptions of human control and economic 
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exchange. Experiences of participation and empathy, especially with non-human 
entities, are regarded as, at best, harmless indulgences. Consequently, while our 
restless unease drives us towards consumerism and narcissistic forms of 'personal 
growth', experiences of self as undergoing profound transformations as we grow 
into larger systems are rare and often pathologized. As Anand Paranjpe notes, "one 
gets the impression that in Western philosophy and psychology there is a cultivated 
sense of aversion for any kind of personal transformation."xxiii   
 
 
TRANSFORMATION AND AUTHENTICITY 
 
 'Grey Owl's' exposure as 'really' Archie Belaney reflects this conventional 
view of identity as largely predetermined. However far removed Grey Owl's new 
lifestyle was from the English cultural landscape, his accident of birth cast him as 
definitively English, and therefore restricted the identity choices available to him. 
The enormous diversity of possible occupational choices in industrial society 
conceals what virtually all these choices have in common: the assumption of a 
lifelong radical separation between the individual and the rest of the natural world. 
In this situation where almost all identity choices embody the same underlying 
pathology and repression, it is not surprising that more adventurous souls may 
attempt to abandon this social context for one that more adequately expresses their 
felt resonance with the natural world.  
 But this is a move that is fraught with problems. Ethnicity and family 
background are not the only defining aspects of identity; but simply pushing them 
aside in the impulse to trade in one cultural frame for another is as unrealistic as the 
opposite error of over-emphasizing them. Also, the desire to embrace another 
cultural framework as a 'lifestyle choice' within industrial society has spawned facile 
blends of New Age philosophy, pop psychology, commodified Asian religion, and 
supposedly 'Indian' wisdom, in which the conscious adoption of an 'alternative' 
stance covers up the less conscious perpetuation of conventional allegiances. In 
these respects, Archie Belaney was certainly not the most dishonest of the 
'whiteshamans' who have emerged over the past century or so: at least he lived in 
the wilderness rather than staying in Beverley Hills and writing about an entirely 
invented experience, and he was closer to Thoreau than we might comfortably 
acknowledge. The difference, of course, concerns identity: although he lived on the 
fringes of society, Thoreau never claimed to be other than Euroamerican. Why, then, 
did Belaney feel the need fraudulently to claim Indian parentage? 
 A possible reason is suggested if we compare the impact of the two men's 
writings. Before his exposure, 'Grey Owl' sold hundreds of thousands of books, 
drew large audiences across the world, and was courted by kings and queens. In 
contrast, Thoreau was a little known social isolate; and after the first print run of his 
most famous work, 'Walden', the book remained out of print until after his death. It 
appears that if fraudulently pretending to be a Native American is reprehensible, 
not being a Native American in the first place is almost as bad. One wonders how 
well known the 'Seattle speech' would be if it was instead referred to as the 'Perry 
speech'. Could it be that recognizing the depth of our colonization by industrialism, 
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we believe that only those writers who are separated from us by cultural 
background or the passage of time are felt to be acceptable as sources of 
environmental wisdom? Holistic environmental awareness seems to exist in a realm 
that is set apart from mainstream white society, a realm also inhabited by the ethnic, 
the spiritual, and the emotional; and what exists in this realm can only be admitted 
to consciousness if its subsidiary and subordinate status is first accepted. In other 
words, the truths inherent in this awareness are acceptable only on condition that 
they are simultaneously discredited. This is consistent with Wendy Rose's 
observation that Native American writers are shelved under 'Indians', 'Western', or 
some such label, whereas their white counterparts are shelved under 'literature'. 
Furthermore, "if a Native American writer happens to gain international 
prominence, as in the case of Scott Momaday … critics and ethnographers exclaim 
that the author and his or her work is 'not really Indian'. Rather, it suddenly falls 
within the 'mainstream of American letters'".xxiv  
 If feeling, spirituality, and ecological insights were seriously recognized and 
applied within mainstream white society, the consequences would be momentous, 
subverting our exclusive reliance on science and the entire anthropocentric 
justification for the industrialist exploitation of 'natural resources'. It is therefore 
necessary for feeling to be accorded a low status compared to rational argument, 
and relegated to a partly dissociated realm where it cannot seriously challenge 
industrialism. If a semi-permeable boundary is established between these two 
realms, the 'other' can be both acknowledged as a fringe interest while being ignored 
when the important decisions are made. The ascription of ecological wisdom to 
native cultures or past eras therefore protects mainstream white culture, allowing 
this wisdom a sort of dissociated survival within a subordinated sphere that is 
moored loosely alongside technological society without ever being fully accepted 
into it. 'Native literature' is one facet of 'multiculturalism' in modern society, 
suggesting the superficially democratic interaction of a range of ethnicities, 
religions, and cultures while actually cementing them into predefined places within 
an unshakeable politics of economy and power.xxv This allows spiritual and 
environmental awarenesses to be 'taken into account' in policy formulation where 
there is no risk that they would have any significant effect; or – if there is such a risk 
– they may be dismissed as 'unrealistic'. But nobody ever suggests that scientific and 
economic 'realities' should be 'taken into account': they are the unquestioned basis of 
decision making.  
 Simply to dismiss Euroamerican fantasies about native cultures as 
'fraudulent', therefore, is to miss the significance of this phenomenon. The 
underlying problem is that certain types of experience cannot easily find authentic 
expression within industrial society, and are fundamentally incompatible with 
current economic structures. Since Euroamerican society is based on peculiarly 
irrational forms of economic 'rationality' and the rigorous exclusion of other 
meanings, it is difficult – without serious consequences – to embody ecological or 
religious principles in one's working life while remaining part of this society. 
Ecologically sound practices – along with growing vegetables, spiritual exercises, or 
camping in the wilderness – are 'leisure' activities that are separated from the 
serious business of earning a living. If we are sufficiently wealthy, of course, we can 
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retreat to our islands of ecological correctness within the ocean of environmental 
desolation; but such 'solutions' do little to challenge the direction of mainstream 
society, and embody geographically already-existing psychological dissociations. 
For all but a few, an authentic relation to nature can exist only as fantasy; and it 
flourishes in this role precisely because our working lives often fail to fulfill our 
need to feel grounded and in contact with the natural world. A diversity of cultural 
and spiritual options, together with their associated environmental beliefs and 
practices, are allowed a superficial existence in order to camouflage and compensate 
for their opposite: the inescapable uniformity of a capitalist economic and political 
reality that is now the unquestioned basis of our lives.  
 In rather the same way that a mistress can perpetuate a moribund marriage 
by delaying transformative change, these sops to a healthy lifestyle and identity 
maintain industrialism – and its underlying assumptions – by providing temporary 
relief from it. However, as the object relations theorist Harry Guntrip suggested, 
while fantasy is healthy if it is a precursor to action, it is pathological if it is a 
substitute for it.xxvi  We need to ask ourselves: does the action we are taking 
challenge industrialism, or does it exist in the interstices allowed and shaped by 
industrialism? If the latter is the case, then our humanity is being kept alive through 
a 'life-support system' of leisure activities and 'lifestyle choices' just to the extent that 
we remain available to be used within the industrialist system. There is no shortage 
of parallels here: forests, for example, are allowed to flourish to the extent that they 
provide 'timber'; so natural tendencies are permitted and used by the system to 
strengthen itself. Similarly, human needs and desires – most obviously, sexuality – 
that could be part of a healthy world become perverted and distorted when 
harnessed as part of the industrial system.   
 In contrast to most indigenous societies, industrial society defines 'culture' 
and 'nature' in terms of their supposed opposition to each other, leading to a 
chronic, institutionalized lack of psychological integrity. Our socially learned 
characteristics, rather than complementing and expressing those tendencies that 
derive from our embodiment as living creatures, are often seen as replacing them; 
and so our resonance with the natural world, if we are to retain our basic cultural 
orientation, has to occur in a dissociated realm. This is a recurring theme in theories 
of psychopathology from Freud onwardsxxvii, suggesting that it is the basis of a 
persistent cultural malaise. In Carl Rogers' 'person centered' approach, for example, 
psychological distress is viewed in terms of a lack of congruence between a bodily-
based experiential self and a conscious self-concept that develops through the 
introjection of social mores and the denial of embodied awareness.xxviii  The notions 
of truth, reality, and identity implied by these two versions of self differ 
fundamentally; and one of the main tasks of education is to reduce the resultant 
conflict by instilling the belief that embodied 'truth' is misleading and frivolous 
while consciously learned rationality is reliable and correct. But since conscious 
learning cannot completely eliminate embodied awareness, these repressed feelings 
will seek ways of expressing themselves symptomatically through an entirely 
different form of relation to the world, one which implants us empathically in the 
world as it abandons detachment and 'objectivity'. This implies a form of identity, 
and an understanding of human being, that utterly rejects the basic assumptions of 
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industrial life, since – as Tim Ingold says of the Ojibwa – the "achievement of 
empathy means taking on another way of being, [and] full understanding is attained 
not through translation but through metamorphosis."xxix   
 But while native ways of being can be appropriated as fantasies within an 
industrial lifestyle in rather the same way that tribal artifacts are used to decorate a 
modern living room, indigenous realities, if taken to heart, more often directly 
challenge rather than complement Euroamerican representations of nature. The 
world represented in Native American writing, for example, diverges from the 
neatly arranged conceptual order that our cognitive representations assume, 
embodying – as William Bevis puts it – an "apparent fragmentation of the natural 
world into a huge cast of individual 'micro-characters', a fragmentation that has not 
been properly noted because it does not fit white formulas … Cows, bats, 
mosquitoes, blackbirds, coyotes, magpies act in their individual, peculiar ways".xxx  
This is a world which is allowed to be, seemingly incoherent because it has not yet 
been made to fit within a humanly recognizable order. One thing does not 
'symbolize' another, conforming to any anthropocentric taxonomy of 
comprehension: things and creatures just are, in their own peculiar ways, and 
relating to them involves a self-transformative effort of empathy rather than an 
attempt to assimilate them to a pre-existing cognitive pattern. Bevis illustrates this 
by referring to the writing of D'Arcy McNickle: 
 
 Archilde is at Mission School, and one afternoon a cloud 
  "by curious coincidence … assumed the form of a cross - in the reflection of 
the setting sun, a flaming cross. The prefect was the first to observe the curiosity and it put 
him into a sort of ecstasy … 
  'The Sign! The Sign!' he shouted. His face was flushed and his eyes gave off 
flashing lights - Archilde did not forget them. 
  'The Sign! Kneel and pray!' 
  The boys knelt and prayed, some of them frightened and on the point of 
crying. They knew what the sign signified … the second coming of Christ, when the world 
was to perish in flames." 
 The cloud, of course, melts away, but curiously Archilde does not need this 
empirical proof to reject Christianity's symbolic use of nature: 
 "It was not the disappearance of the threatening symbol which freed him from the 
priest's dark mood, but something else. At the very instant that the cross seemed to burn 
most brightly, a bird flew across it … It flew past and returned several times before finally 
disappearing - and what seized Archilde's imagination was the bird's unconcernedness. It 
recognized no 'sign'. His spirit lightened. He felt himself fly with the bird."xxxi 
 
For Archilde, openness to his sensing of the world takes precedence over any 
elaborate conceptual scheme. The world comes first. This is also true, Bevis argues, 
of other native American writers: in James Welch's work, for example, "the natural 
world … is strangely (to whites) various, objective, unsymbolic, as if it had not yet 
been taken over by the human mind."xxxii   
 Renouncing consumer society for the world that Welch and McNickle imply 
demands more than cosmological tourism. To paraphrase another critic of 
mercantile society, it is generally easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a 
needle than it is for an affluent inhabitant of the industrialised world to live in a 
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spiritually and ecologically consistent way. The impossibility of reconciling the 
fundamental industrialist assumption that we are separate from the natural world 
(including our own bodies) with the indigenous belief that human society is 
grounded in the natural world leads us to dissociate nature and feeling from 
economic 'realities'. Anything that challenges this dissociation leads to an 
unbearable degree of cognitive dissonance, in which mutually incompatible beliefs 
threaten to overwhelm our psychological equilibrium. 
 The assumption made by 'Grey Owl' that he could not, as Archie Belaney, 
achieve the more natural lifestyle he craved was well founded. As a teenager in 
Hastings, he "loved to go off on solitary walks to look for plants and wild 
animals";xxxiii but in the stiflingly provincial life of southern England, these activities 
were necessarily part of a dissociated realm of bodily awarenesses and inarticulable 
intuitions. Such experiences of contact with the natural world, in one form or 
another, are important in the psychological development of most children; but as 
Cynthia Tomashow notes, for many of us, "this aspect of identity seems to shrivel 
and recede to the dark reaches of … consciousness".xxxiv Instead of developing and 
incorporating our bodily awarenesses as we reach out into the world, we instead 
learn that rational thought, the technological power that flows from it, and the 
economic structures within which 'business' can flourish are the fundamentals of 
life. Unlike most of us, Belaney rejected this socialized mode of being: what we play 
at, he made the centre of his life, rejecting capitalist society and his past identity 
within it. In order to do so, he lied about his parentage; but whether this course of 
action demonstrates less integrity than our more usual acceptance of the 
dissociations inherent in industrialized life is debatable. Under current conditions, 
the choice may not be a clear one between truth and untruth, or between 




THE HUNGER FOR FORM 
 
 The dearth of ways expressing and justifying our embodied awarenesses 
makes us hungry for any suitable form; and this makes it easier to understand the 
enormous popularity of the Seattle 'speech' and the writings of Grey Owl. The 
unexpressed emotional needs of Euroamericans, unable to find more authentic 
modes of expression, give rise to the invention of forms of 'indigenous wisdom' that 
are often unrecognizable by the indigenous peoples concerned.xxxv Although this 
flourishing tradition of 'whiteshamanism' and the disingenuous literature it has 
generated are exploitative of the peoples and traditions they parody,xxxvi the 
emotional needs that underlie them are real enough. These needs should be frankly 
recognized, and expressed in honest forms such as fiction that is acknowledged to be 
fiction, so keeping alive the vision of ecological integrity until such time as it can be 
realized in physical reality.  
 Such subjective awarenesses are allowed to play only minor roles in the 
material but illusory world that focuses on the production and consumption of 
commodities. In this manufactured world, "what we experience is not real and what 
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is real is not what we experience".xxxvii While experience, in other words, in a flow of 
feelings, glimpses, intuitions, associations, and sensations, invites us to enter a world 
that transcends current actualities, this greater world is classified as unreal and 
replaced by a substitute, cognitive world defined in terms of material, biochemical, 
and economic categories that are learned but unfelt. Today, this partial view of 
reality is not just a learned understanding, however: increasingly, it is becoming the 
built structure of the world itself, so that the sort of world we have evolved to 
expect, hope for, and participate in is a latent world, hidden from us by a crude and 
degraded actuality. The task facing the environmentalist of the future, then, may be 
less one of conserving a world that is under threat, and increasingly one of 
actualizing a world that exists largely as a hope, a memory, and an intuition. As the 
novelist J. G. Ballard asserts, the  
balance between fiction and reality has changed significantly in the past 
decades. Increasingly, their roles are reversed. We live in a world ruled by 
fictions of every kind – mass merchandising, advertising, politics conducted 
as a branch of advertising, the pre-empting of any original response to 
experience by the television screen … It is now less and less necessary for the 
writer to invent the fictional content of his novel. The fiction is already there. 
The writer's task is to invent the reality.xxxviii 
   
 Subjectivity, then, is not just a froth on the surface of reality, to be skimmed 
off and thrown away. It can also be a guide to what is missing both from our own 
lives and from the contexts we inhabit. Perry's version of the Seattle 'speech' was, as 
he himself was at pains to point out, largely a work of fiction; but the roots of this 
fiction come from an awareness that extends well beyond present forms of 
consciousness into the realm of a repressed, dissociated, cultural unconscious. As 
Rudolf Kaiser suggests, the Seattle 'speech' seems  
to touch on an idea and a feeling that have so far largely been banned from 
our occidental, Christian, Western culture. It is the idea that the worldly and 
the spiritual, the mundane and the beyond, the profane and the sacred are not 
wholly separate from each other, as we are used to thinking; but that these 
seeming opposites are actually very closely connected in this world and that 
therefore everything in this world without any exception is seen as sacred in 
its nature and its character. This idea that each and every thing and creature in 
this world is spiritual and sacred may well prove to be the salient point of this 
text … for a society which has always neatly separated the temporal and the 
spiritual and in this way has tried to justify man's claim that all the non-sacred 
world is at his disposal.xxxix 
 
 The notion that, say, a Douglas Fir, far from being merely the ‘raw material’ 
for garden furniture, is part of a system that is both natural and sacred is so at odds 
with our lifestyle, our education, and our inflated material 'needs' that to express it 
is to risk ridicule. As I argued above, such notions can only be allowed to exist 
within consciousness on condition that they are relegated to a psychological 
bantustan of ethnic, spiritual, and environmental awareness that is excluded from 
the main current of our thought. While the text of the 'Seattle speech' was not 
written by Seattle, it nevertheless, as Kaiser argues, possesses a kind of validity; and 
it can be understood as the product of an awareness that is also a hope, one that 
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resonates widely because it represents the shadow of the technological 
understanding of the world. This awareness can in present times not survive within 
mainstream politics, and is not viewed as 'real'; so it is necessary that it lead a 
dissociated existence as 'fiction' or 'fantasy'. But it should be recognized that in 
important ways, these dissociated realms are more real than what currently passes 
for reality.  
 As the destruction of the natural world proceeds, it becomes increasingly 
necessary to find ways of expressing not only what is, but also what could be: a 
healthy world, and those larger resonant structures that will be an essential part of 
such a world. To the extent that theory is consistent only with current, diminished 
forms of reality, it will be incapable of providing a basis for a movement away from 
these realities toward healthier ones: as Marcuse observed, to "the degree to which 
they correspond to the given reality, thought and behavior express a false 
consciousness, responding to and contributing to the preservation of a false order of 
facts."xl An adequate theory will also grasp the importance of relation, empathy, and 
emergent properties even when these are largely absent from the world today. In 
Michael Lambek's terms, the "basic question [is] whether [a] theory corresponds to 
the world as it is, whether it has … 'veracity' (Descartes' certum; or 'correctness'); or 
whether it provides an ideal and has 'verity' (Vico's verum) against which the facts 
must be measured and perhaps found wanting."xli  We need to be clear about which 
version of truth we are working within; and whether the future world we envision is 
an extension of current realities, or a transformation of these realities.  
 If we are to keep alive the long-term aim of a healthy world, we need to 
recognize that the term 'fictional' need not always mean 'unreal', but can also refer to 
what is not currently actualized. Great fiction can illustrate truths about life that are 
not always expressible through science; for science often captures the bare skeletons 
of once living creatures, shorn of everything that is inessential to the particular 
model adopted– the living flesh, the hopes and fears and beliefs, the connections 
and relations. In this vein, the novelist Toni Morrison argues that since we haven't 
yet found a way to preserve subjectivity, it will necessarily be the first casualty of 
historical recording. Morrison therefore refers to her writing as "a kind of literary 
archaeology: on the basis of some information and a little bit of guesswork you 
journey to a site to see what remains were left behind and to reconstruct the world 
that these remains imply. What makes it fiction is the nature of the imaginative act: 
my reliance on the image … on the remains … in addition to recollection, to yield up 
a kind of truth."xlii  
 Such 'fiction', which attempts to reconstruct a meaningful world from a few 
residual fragments, is no less 'true' than more conservative writing which refuses to 
go beyond the fragments themselves. If we live – as we increasingly do – in a world 
of ecological fragments, then we cannot take this as the 'true' world: rather, we need 
to imaginatively reconstruct the possibility of a more whole, healthy world. As 
Morrison remarks, " … the crucial distinction … is not the difference between fact 
and fiction, but the distinction between fact and truth …".xliii This is a form of truth 
unrecognizable by those ostensibly 'objective' sciences that deny subjectivity any 
validity.  
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 A reliance on 'facts', then, cannot be seen as an adequate default position: as 
Bernard Williams has pointed out, such a reliance "is itself an offence against 
truthfulness".xliv David James Duncan makes a complementary point: 
 
 fiction-making and lying are two different things. To write War and 
Peace required imaginative effort. To embezzle money from a bank does, too. 
[This] does not make Tolstoy a bank robber. War and Peace is an imaginative 
invention but also, from beginning to end, a truth-telling and a gift-giving. 
We know before reading a sentence that Tolstoy "made it all up", but this 
making is as altruistic and disciplined as the engineering of a cathedral. It 
uses mastery of language, spectacular acts of empathy, and meticulous 
insight into a web of individuals and a world to present a man's vast, 
haunted love for his Russian people. And we as readers get to recreate this 
love in ourselves. We get to reenter the cathedral. xlv 
 
 A disciplined subjectivity can enable us to 'reenter the cathedral' of the wild 
world and to nurture it; for just as Descartes' subjectivity of doubt has been largely 
realized in a mechanical and unfelt world, so a more complete subjectivity of 
empathy and relation can, eventually, be realized in a healthier one. As Ingold 
remarks, "we should resist the temptation to assume that since stories are stories 
they are … unreal or untrue, for this is to suppose that the only reality, or true truth, 
is one in which we … can have no part in at all. Telling a story … is not like 
unfurling a tapestry to cover up the world, it is rather a way of guiding the attention 
of listeners or readers into it".xlvi  It is not my intention to suggest either that science 
should be rejected or that fiction necessarily communicates truths; only that we need 
an understanding that as well as including science, also goes beyond it. An 
environmental movement, and a society, that limits its understanding to what is 
scientifically defensible impairs its ability to defend the natural world and is 
symptomatic of a crippled subjectivity.   
 Media such as film and fiction are not necessarily just the fanciful diversions 
of childhood, or distractions from the harsh realities of adulthood. If environmental 
ethics is to reach a wider audience, as David Johns has argued, we will need to use 
forms of communication that are "explicitly emotive and personally grounded". … 
Although philosophy seeks to answer the same questions as myth – questions of 
meaning – philosophy does not even remotely approach the influence of the more 
potent modern forms of modern myth: novels and film. It would do well to learn 
from them."xlvii 
 Furthermore, if humanity and the non-human world are to survive in a more-
than-biological sense, we will need to accept that we are continuous with our 
cultural and ecological contexts; and consequently, that authenticity is difficult to 
achieve in a world in which these contexts are degraded. We would do well 
explicitly to recognize our own colonization by industrialism, admitting that the 
battle between ecological structures and industrialism is being fought within 
ourselves as well as in the world outside. Just as the 'weeds' and 'vermin' that we 
have tried to annihilate may belatedly be recognized as forms of diversity necessary 
for the regeneration of the wild world, so censored modes of experience, together 
with the devalued forms of communication through which they can be expressed, 
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may conserve aspects of reality that may one day become actual. The sort of truth 
conveyed by such forms, like that embodied in the Seattle 'speech' or in Grey Owl's 
writings, differs from that of the physical sciences; and this should be recognized as 
a strength as well as a weakness. There is a curious and paradoxical authenticity in 
accepting the present impossibility of either individual or ecological health; and in 
this acceptance we abandon our narcissistic individual aspirations for consistency, 
wholeness, and an 'ecological' lifestyle, instead aligning our imperfect lives with the 
dream, the vision, and the hope of a healthier future world. In working to bring 
about such a world, we rediscover our own authenticity.   
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